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Abstract   
The dispute between Turkey and Greece regarding Cyprus has been a major source of concern in global politics 
and has drawn the attention of many nations and international organizations, particularly after Turkey’s military 
intervention in 1974. Turkey has tried to justify its intervention, which has been disputed, with its legality in 
international law questioned, and until now no solution appears in sight for the Cyprus problem. This paper tries 
to shed some light on the legal position of Turkey’s military venture in Cyprus and the options for a hopeful 
solution to the Cyprus issue, how Turkey has pursued the Cyprus issue since its beginning, with allies such as 
the United States, as well as with certain organizations including the EU, the UN and the O.I.C. The paper 
argues that Turkey’s intervention suffered from a crisis of authority regarding its legitimacy, as only the UN 
Security Council could authorize an intervention, and also saw unification or official partioning as the only 
options for the resolution of the dispute.                        
Keywords: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, U.S., International law, Settlement.                                                              
                                                                    
1. Introduction                                           
Cyprus has remained a disputed island between two communities since its independence from the British in 
1960. This dispute is mainly explained in terms of constitutional disagreements, which was seen to have been 
negotiated by Britain, Greece, and Turkey in what came to be known as the London/Zurich Accords which 
recognized them as Guarantor States. It is claimed that the independence constitution did not emanate from the 
Cyprus people, but from these Guarantor States which have also given themselves rights of intervention in the 
event of a violation of the provisions of the said constitution by any of the groups in Cyprus. In 1963 violence 
broke out in the Island as a result of disagreements on the provisions of the constitution. This gave way to the 
intervention of the United Nations to restore order in the island, but even then not completely. In 1974, the 
republic of Turkey was seen to have intervened in the Island on the grounds that the Turkish community have 
been denied certain rights by the Greek community and have become victims of continued violence and 
persecution in the Island. Turkish claims may have been true, and the Greek Cypriots since 1963 had been 
blamed for the violence against the Turkish Cypriot community, just as they were blamed of usurping the 
constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. But that notwithstanding, many have raised questions about the 
intervention of Turkey based on the Treaty of Guarantee. The intervention was seen to have been faulted on two 
bases, one from the perspective of international law, and the second from the perspective of the Treaty of 
Guarantee itself because the intervention led to a division in the island and is clearly in contradiction with the 
purpose of intervention as contained in the treaty. But under international law, it remained a subject of debate, 
with both sides claiming grounds, but this paper argues that the intervention has violated international and 
diplomatic laws, especially with regards to authority. It is accepted that the Treaty of Guarantee has given 
Turkey the right of intervention. But this should have been after due notification and appropriate approval of the 
UN Security Council as contained and in line with the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter 
on the rights of individual/collective enforcement action. This despite the fact the Cyprus issue has been 
subjected to a lot of political maneuvering, which sometimes has led to sentimental judgments regarding the 
issue. Of course the Greek Cypriots, have been identified as responsible for the dispute in the island, but here it 
is seen as purely an internal issue, whereas the intervention of Turkey has led the dispute into taking an 
international dimension, that would have to be legally clarified irrespective whatever may have happened on the 
island. The paper is divided into sub sections, from a background to the 1963 dispute, President Johnson’s letter 
and the perceptions of U.S. and Turkey, and the intervention of Turkey in 1974 under international law, as well 
as the involvement of the OIC and the EU in the dispute, which highlights the political undertones of the issue 
and a conclusion at the end.   
Many articles in books, journals and internet resources were consulted in the course of writing this article and 
became more of an investigative writing. One finds out that many articles have been written on the dispute. But 
unfortunately, many among them or most were purely sentimental and politicized; therefore an objective study 
becomes somewhat difficult. As a result of this, the article tries very hard to concentrate on and look at certain 
legal claims, regarding the claims of both sides and the justification for the intervention by Turkey. A careful 
study of the resources was undertaken to bring out the facts to the forefront. Here, it has become necessary to 
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2. Background 
Cyprus Island has a long and interesting history. The island became independent in 1960; however, it had been 
subjected to the influence of various rulers who left imprints on the legal systems. In 1572 the Ottoman Empire 
overthrew the dominance and control of the Venetians, who the Cypriots did not appreciate.  The Ottomans were 
seen to have introduced the Millet System which seems to have recognized the independence of the Orthodox 
Greek Church and its authority. The Ottomans ensured the existence of the Byzantines and the Greek legal 
structures side by side. Following the collapse of Ottoman rule, the British were said to have exercised control 
over the island since 1878. The British succeeded in introducing a modern legal system, side by side with 
religious jurisdiction and the application of English law. Despite the changes in its legal system and the common 
law, the influence of Greek law sometimes also manifested in the island`s legal system. The Greek law itself 
having undergone changes as a result of the influence of European legal system, left traces of French law also on 
the island, whereas the influence of Turkey can be seen in the Northern part of the island.  
At independence, Britain, Greece and Turkey were recognized as the guarantors of the republic, and came up 
with a constitution for the island which is sometimes known as the Zurich Constitution.  The Treaty that gave 
recognition to these three countries as guarantor powers is also known as either the London or Zurich Accord, 
which provided for the new constitution and the right of intervention of these powers in the affairs of the island 
in the event of constitutional violation. As a result of the nature of the Cyprus Constitution and its controversial 
provisions, the country has come to be regarded as a quasi protectorate. The idea of the constitutional provisions 
was not that of segregation, but one of establishing a federal state. However, after independence adherence to the 
constitutional provisions proved difficult for the infant nation as differences began to emerge between the two 
distinct groups inhabiting the Island with regards to certain rights and privileges provided by the constitution. 
The Greek Cypriots were seen to have usurped the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in terms of governance, in 
contradiction to the provisions of the partnership republic as contained in the Cyprus Constitution.  
 
3. Turkey and the 1963 Cyprus Problem 
Since the creation and independence of the republic of Cyprus in 1960, the two communities (i.e. Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots) continued to have disagreements regarding the running of the affairs of the State. Although the 
independence constitution had specified the role and rights of each community, nevertheless disagreements 
evolved soon after the infant state had settled for governance. The lack of mutual confidence and trust between 
the two communities was largely seen as responsible for their inability to cooperate in running the affairs of the 
island. The Greek majority in the Island could not accept the constitutional provisions which granted the Turkish 
community the veto power in certain areas of the State such as foreign affairs, defense and a lot of other key 
domestic issues. The Turkish community on the other hand, remained committed to the provisions of the 
constitution which granted them such privileges. While such an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust 
continued between the two communities, Makarios who became the President of the Island at independence in 
1960 initiated certain constitutional changes or amendments. Generally, he proposed the creation of a unitary 
system of government which would be under a majority rule. The Turkish community was quick to reject these 
amendments which the President presented to the Parliament for consideration. These developments created a 
much tensed atmosphere throughout the island, which later culminated in the outbreak of violence. The Greek 
Cypriots took advantage of their higher population and took over control of the island and succeeded in isolating 
the Turks. At this time Britain, which had maintained troops on the island tried to intervene and put a stop to the 
violence but failed due a number of reasons. Both communities in Cyprus, as well as Greece and Turkey, blamed 
Britain for taking sides in the conflict, and as such it became very difficult for the British to establish order on 
the island. It took the effort of the United Nations peace keeping force in March 1964 to bring the violence under 
control, and even then both communities did not agree nor support the UN forces throughout the operation. Both 
communities continued to receive arms in anticipation of the outbreak of violence, as a result of hatred and 
bitterness that the situation created between the two communities. 
There have been several explanations to the 1963 Cyprus issue, both domestic and foreign, and Makarios is not 
known to openly oppose enosis, but many agree that it was a position openly supported by the Greek Cypriots. It 
was also known that General George Grivas, enjoyed considerable influence, next only to Makarios, and he is 
known as the leader of EOKA, the militant group that had fought for enosis in the 1950’s. General George 
Grivas is also known to enjoy the support and friendship of many Greek cabinet Ministers as well as the 
commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. But even at this time, the Greece cabinet found Makarios’s pro 
communists activities embarrassing, and as a result of the support of Greek Cypriots for Makarios, the Greek 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.26, 2014 
 
29 
government could not go against Makarios. The Greeks support the unification with Cyprus like the Greek 
Cypriots, which they see as the solution to the conflict. But, Greece’s government never made its position 
officially known and tended to handle the matter silently. 
The Turkish community on the other hand was powerless and had to rely on Turkey for support. Vice President 
Kucuk, who is seen as the leader of the Turkish community, had been prevented from returning to the island by 
Makarios. The republic of Turkey stationed its army to provide protection to the Turkish community as well as 
relief materials. It is also known that both Britain and the Soviets, to an extent, exerted some influence on the 
island. The Soviets have shown open support to Makarios and were opposed to the British maintaining a base on 
the island. Meanwhile, a Greek-Turkish clash was anticipated as a result of the failure of the UN to resolve the 
crisis, and Makarios and the Greek Cypriots are not likely to accept double enosis, and likewise the Turkish 
Cypriots and the republic of Turkey are also not likely to accept an enosis with Greece. 
 
4. President Johnson’s Letter: U.S./Turkey Perspectives  
Following the developments in Cyprus, particularly the actions of the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish 
community, the republic of Turkey was said to have contemplated a military operation on the island. Turkey 
needed to have the support of its main ally, the United States to carry out a military operation following the 
failure of the UN to bring an end to the crisis. Turkey was hopeful of a U.S. support and decided to communicate 
its intentions officially. The U.S. had earlier been informed of a possible military operation from either Turkey 
or Greece in the area following the UN failure. U.S President Johnson responded to Turkey’s concerns for 
military operation in a letter dated 5th of June, 1964, in which he informed Turkish officials that “NATO allies 
have not had the chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviets if 
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO 
allies…I must tell you in all condor that the United States cannot agree to the use of United States supplied 
military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present circumstances.” Following such a 
response, Turkey cancelled its plans for intervention, and the Turkish Prime Minister expressed his displeasure 
over the letter of President Johnson, arguing that a warning should have been directed at Greece not Turkey. The 
letter was received with deep shock within the Turkish society, and was seen as a betrayal of Turkey on the part 
of the United States which Turkey for long had relied upon so much. The letter was seen as an insult to the 
dignity of Turkey, and it resulted in serious doubts about the commitment not just to the United States, but it led 
Turkish policy makers for the first time to question its membership of the NATO alliance. 
President Johnson’s criticisms about Turkey’s intentions rather than Greece were as a result of certain national 
interests of the United States. Cyprus was seen as important, as its control gives an advantage in the 
Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, in terms of strategy and operations. The U.S. feared that if a war arose 
between Turkey and Greece, it could weaken NATO’S southern flank, and if the U.S backed Turkey, this could 
push Greece to the Soviet camp who had already requested support from the Soviets. Generally, the 
disagreement between the U.S. and Turkey with regards to the Cyprus problem was seen from different 
perspectives by both countries. While the United States as a global actor, tended to interpret issues with global 
concerns, Turkey on the other hand as a regional power, was more concerned with the regional dimension of the 
issue. Despite Turkey’s concerns about the Soviets, concerns for Greece superseded all other concerns. The two 
countries did not appear to have unified goals regarding the conflict. The U.S. appeared to be more concerned 
about maintaining NATO’s integrity and preventing the Soviet from exploiting opportunities to penetrate and 
weaken the alliance, whereas Turkey’s concern was the expansion of Greece. Domestically, the United States 
appeared to be concerned with Greek-American citizens due to the coming elections.  In Turkey also, domestic 
tensions had forced the Turkish government to pursue a strict policy towards Cyprus, following protests due to 
the mass killings on Cyprus Island. 
The reactions of Turkey towards the United States with regards to Cyprus and the letter of President Johnson, 
was that it led Turkey’s policy makers to re-consider a new foreign policy that would make Turkey much more 
independent of the United States. Turkey began to pursue a multilateral foreign policy in order to achieve its 
national interests which it considered incompatible with those of the United States. Turkey henceforth pursued a 
policy of neutrality in the politics of the Middle East region, unlike in the past where it was seen to have 
supported a U.S-Israeli alliance in the region. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey called for the withdrawal 
of Israel from Arab captured territories at the UN Assembly. At the same time Turkey maintained a very 
cautious approach so as not to be completely alienated by its western allies. Turkey at this time was facing a kind 
of isolation from its western partners. And when the Greeks resumed their attacks on the Turkish community on 
the island, Turkey resumed its threat of military action on the island in November 1967, which was averted by 
the mediation of the U.S. and the UN. The Greeks pledged to withdraw its forces from the island as requested by 
Turkey. The American mediation and its results which were on Turkish terms helped restore American image 
within the Turkish society at that time. 
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5. Turkey’s Intervention in 1974 and International Law 
On the 5th of July, 1974, a military coup took place in Cyprus; the coup appeared to have been organized by the 
military regime which then ruled Greece. Turkey had since 1963 sought for an opportunity to intervene and 
maintain a military presence on the island, but could not at that time due to the opposition it faced from its 
Western allies, and particularly from the United States, which saw to the exchange of letters between the Turkish 
Prime Minister Enonu and President Johnson of the United States. The coup did not succeed and was foiled, and 
democratic order was restored in the Island. Despite the failure of the coup, the republic of Turkey went ahead 
and carried out a military operation in the Island on 20th of July, 1974, using the coup as a pretext. Turkey 
justified its operation on the powers granted it by the London /Zurich Accords or the Treaty of Guarantee as it is 
otherwise known. The Treaty recognizes Turkey among the three Guarantor States including Britain and Greece 
and stated that “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and England, 
undertake to consult together with a view to making representations or taking necessary steps to ensure 
observance of those provisions. In so far as common concerted actions may prove impossible, each of the three 
guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs 
established by the present treaty.” 
The legality or otherwise of the actions taken by the republic of Turkey to intervene in the Island has remained a 
subject of debate among scholars for about four decades. While many see the justification of the intervention, 
many others see the intervention as a violation of international law. Many are also of the opinion that because the 
Cyprus issue has been politicized, no legal position will appear to be acceptable to any side on the matter, many 
point to the role or attitude of the European Union and certain European countries towards the issue as a pointer 
to the bias nature of the conflict. Although sometimes such claims may not be totally untrue, especially if one 
looks at the manner in which the EU accepted Cyprus as a member before any settlement could reached, when it 
had earlier made a position that Cyprus could only be accepted after a settlement. These and related issues 
seemed to have politicized the issue, and made any legal position unacceptable. The Cyprus problem has 
overtime become more complex and a solution appears to be far in sight.  Not only did some scholars argue 
against the justification of Turkey’s intervention on the island, but the Treaty of Guarantee’s legality in 
international law was questioned. Generally the compatibility of the treaty with international law raised some 
inconsistencies, especially as it concerns the various operation mechanisms of certain international organizations 
such as the United Nations, which were seen to have been established for collective security of member nations. 
International law itself is seen as a phenomena that developed overtime, and sought to intervene in the wars and 
massacres, just and unjust among mankind, to minimize the level of violence between communities and 
individual nation states. Limitation to violence is seen as the very essence of civilization. This was seen initially 
in customary rules from religion, especially among people who shared cultural, religious and historical roots. In 
the same way it is argued that the fathers of international law were seen to have contributed decisively to the 
adoption of rules that were designed to contain the violence of war. These rules became rooted in positive law in 
the practice and will of sovereign states. States opened the way for the acceptance of these laws on a universal 
scope, which is capable of overcoming divisions between cultures and religion. 
While scholars like Grotias (1583-1645) remained attached to the doctrine of “Just Wars,” he was seen to have 
laid the foundation of an international law that also laid the foundation of laws and customs of War which have 
remained relevant till today. After Grotias, Vattel (1714-1767) tried to put Grotias doctrine of Just Wars into 
perspective, arguing that it was difficult for a decision to be taken on a conflict involving two parties who all 
claim to be defending a just cause. War was seen as an imperfect way of settling disputes between two parties 
that recognize no common judge. These rules were gradually codified in the Geneva conventions of 1864, 1906, 
1929, and 1949 as well as in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907. Recourse to War was first restricted by the Covenant of the League of Nations, as it came to be prohibited 
by the Paris Pact, as well as the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations made it clear that recourse to 
force is prohibited in international relations, with the exception of collective enforcement action provided in 
chapter VII, and the right of individual or collective self defense reserved in Article 51 which states that 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the UN Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right 
of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to at anytime take action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
In furtherance to the argument on the legality of the treaty of guarantee or its otherwise validity, especially when 
related to Article 51 of the UN Charter XVI, Article 103 under the Miscellaneous Provisions, the provision  has 
clearly underscored the effectiveness of the treaty or its supposed superiority to international law, as it states that 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
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prevail.” First and foremost we must understand that the U.N charter has been signed and accepted by all states 
involved in the Cyprus dispute, as such the U.N here is seen to have been accepted as a common judge between 
nation states. If this is so, then the states involved must be seen to abide by the rules and regulations guiding 
international conduct as issued by the United Nations, since the organisation itself was founded by nations states 
themselves, including Turkey, Greece and Britain  in 1945 for collective security. Here it is worthy to note that 
even though the London or Zurich Accord has conferred powers on the guarantor states  to intervene in the 
affairs of the island in the event of a violation of provisions of the establishment treaty, if international law was 
to be followed and observed in accordance with Article 51 and the provisions of chapter XVI, Article 103 
mentioned above, Turkey should have first notified the UN Security Council of its intention to carry out a 
military operation in its capacity as a guarantor state in the affairs of the island based on the Treaty of 
Establishment or the London/Zurich Accord. As stated in the provision, reporting such intention does not “affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to at anytime take actions it 
deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security.” What this means is that it is the UN 
Security Council that will determine if such unilateral operation is justified or not, after an assessment of the 
situation, and upon obtaining an appropriate authority such operations could be carried out. Under international 
humanitarian law and ethics and principles of intervention no single body or entity has the power to authorize 
any intervention apart from the UN Security Council as stated in the excerpt from the UN Charter below; 
 
 
* There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military 
intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a 
source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has. 
 
* Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being 
carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council 
raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
 
* The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are 
allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate 
verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention. 
 
* The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters 
where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military 
intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support. 
 
* If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are: 
 
I. Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting 
for Peace” procedure; and 
 
II. Action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII   the 
Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council. 
 
* The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule 
out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the 
United Nations may suffer thereby. 
 
So it is apparent that the intervention by Turkey suffers from a crisis of legitimacy with regards to the source of 
authority it used for the intervention. It is not sufficient for Turkey to rely on the treaty of guarantee to intervene, 
without adequate notification and approval of the Security Council or the UN General Assembly as stated above. 
Morever, the UN has maintained presence in Cyprus since the 1963 crisis, and therefore it cannot be accused of 
inaction. Since the 14th of July, 1974, the United States department for Intelligence research issued a report 
(Intelligence report 8047) in which it said the government of Greece had negotiated a set of agreements that were 
seriously flawed. The report had noted with regards to the treaty of guarantee, questioning its effectiveness in 
relation to common or unilateral action as exemplified by the 1974 intervention by Turkey which brought about 
divergent opinions about the conflict by all the three countries. The report further noted that the documents 
establishing the republic were negotiated without the consent and involvement  of the Cypriots, and were 
therefore unworkable, and that any resolution of the Cyprus conflict must avoid these agreements. The Treaty 
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itself appears to be some how not recognised by the UN especially if we look at the Charter related to 
international treaties. The United Nations in the chapter below has made it mandatory that all valid treaties  be 
registered and published by the Secretariat of the UN as seen with those below, which does not include the 
London/Zurich Accords that gave this guarantor rights to Turkey, Greece and England. And this clearly proves 
the non-recognition and invalidity of the Treaty of Guarantee upon which Turkey based its occupation of 
Cyprus, and that the said Treaty cannot be effective in International Law, given this circumstance. It therefore 
means Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus, despite genuine humanitarian concerns, remains illegal according to 
United Nations and diplomatic Laws. Chapter XVI  of the Miscellanous Provisions, Article 102 states that: 
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations 
after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and 
published by it. 
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ 
of the United Nations. 
 and  Article 103 states that: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations  under 
the present Charter shall prevail. 
 
 
And for the purpose of full disclosure and in order to provide for further reference the list of registered and  
Published  Treatise by the United Nations Secretariat is presented below; 
 
Bello" Convention (SECAB) 
African Charter on Human Rights 
Agreement of Lima 
Air Quality Agreement 
Amazon Treaty 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention 
Antarctic Treaty 
ASEAN Agreement 
Athens Protocol 
Baghdad Pact 
Bamako Convention 
Banjul Charter on Human Rights 
Barcelona Convention 
Basel Convention 
Berne Convention 
Bogota Pact 
Bonn Convention (conservation of migratory species) 
Brazília Treaty (Treaty for Amazonian co-operation) 
Bretton Woods Agreements (IMF) 
Brusselles Convention (civil liability:carriage of nuclear material by sea) 
Brussels Treaty (collective self-defense) 
BW Convention (bacteriological weapons) 
Canberra Convention (CCAMLR, Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention) 
Cartagena Convention (Caribbean region: protection) 
CITES (endangered species) 
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CLC (civil liability for oil pollution damage) 
Continental Shelf Convention 
EEC Treaty 
ENMOD Convention (disarmament) 
Espoo Convention (environmental impact assessment) 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
Geneva Conventions (with Protocols) 
Georgetown Agreement (ACP) 
Guadalajara Convention (international carriage by air ) 
High Seas Convention 
High Seas Fishing Convention (living resources: conservation) 
ICCPR (civil and political rights) 
ICESC (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
Law of the Sea Convention 
Lima Convention 
Lisbon Agreement (appellations of origin: protection) 
Locarno Agreement 
Lomé Convention (ACP-EEC Convention) 
Madrid Agreement 
Malaga-Torremolinos Convention (ITU/Telecommunications) 
MARPOL (maritime pollution) 
Montevideo Treaty 
Moon Treaty 
NAOS Agreement (North Atlantic Ocean Stations) 
Nice Agreement (int. classification of goods and services) 
Nordic Convention 
Nordic Patent Institute 
Noumea Convention (South Pacific Region SPREC) 
NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) 
Outer Space Treaty 
Ozone Convention (Vienna Convention) 
Pact of San Jose, Cosat Rica (human rights) 
Panama Convention (SELA) 
Paris Convention (industrial property: protection) 
Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) 
Phyto-Sanitary Convention (Africa, Sahara) 
Protocol of Port of Spain 
Puerto Montt Act 
Quadripartite Agreement 
Ramsar Convention (Wetlands Convention) 
Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) 
Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty) 
Rome Convention 
Rome Statute 
Rome Treaty (EEC) 
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) 
Sea-bed Treaty (Nuclear weapons) 
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Single European Act 
SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) 
Strasbourg Agreement (int. patent classification) 
Tashkent declaration (India: Pakistan) 
Territorial Sea-Contiguous Zone Convention 
TIR Convention (Customs convention) 
Tlatelolco Treaty 
UNESCO Constitution 
Warsaw Convention (air transport) 
Warsaw Treaty 
Whaling Convention 
World Charter for Nature 
 
It is important to note that the said Treaty of Guarantee or Zurich Accord, as it is popularly known, did not 
feature in the list of the various treaties, agreements and conventions registered with the United Nations 
Secretariat, which all ought to have been. A treaty as important as the Guarantee Treaty, if only without flaws 
should ordinarily have been among all other treatise. Here one can only speculate, but it is obvious that probably 
it may have been rejected by the UN, otherwise there is no explanation for its absence. Definately the 
beneficiaries may have attempted to make the treaty legal at one time or the other but probably failed to secure 
the registration of the treaty by the UN secretariat for obvious reasons. 
 
 
6. Turkey, OIC and the Cyprus Issue 
 
The Organization of Islamic Conference at a point became involved in the Cyprus issue, as a result of the 
membership of the republic of Turkey. Turkey first participated in the OIC Summit in 1969 which took place at 
Rabbat, Morrocco. It was the first time Turkey participated since its establishment in 1923, despite several 
invitations from the organization. Turkey was reluctant to join the OIC due to the secular nature of its 
constitution, which is said is not in conformity with the ideals of the OIC, which seen as an islamic organization. 
Part of the reasons given for Turkey’s participation at the Rabbat Summit, was part the implementation of 
Turkey’s new foreign policy which emerged in the 1960’s. Turkey at this time had to articulate a new foreign 
policy in order to seek support over its Cyprus problem, which it thought it could not achieve through its 
Western allies; especially after the United States failed to support Turkey over the issue. The republic of Turkey 
appeared to have been isolated by its Western allies as a result of the Cyprus issue. Turkey had two 
considerations for joining the OIC, first has to do with prestige in the  eyes of both the West and the Islamic 
World. The second was to seek support of the Islamic World concerning the Cyprus problem as well as other 
interests. But all this while Turkey has not approved the OIC Charter despite having attended many summits of 
the OIC. The Charter is resolution on the part of participants to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and 
economic values and to promote Islamic solidarity among member States. However, the period between 1974-
1980 saw a drastic change in Turkey’s role in the OIC. Some of the reasons for the sudden change include the 
Cyprus issue and the deterioration of the Turkish economy. During this period, Turkey changed its stance on 
both the OIC Charter and the Palestinian issue, and now supported the Palestinian cause, which was marked by 
the opening of a PLO Office in Ankara. At the econominc level, Turkey supported projects for the establishment 
of a common market among Islamic countries without any considerations for EEC regulations. The most 
remarkable achievement Turkey made in its relations with the OIC throughout this period was the support it 
sought for its Cyprus problem. During this period, the OIC recognized the right of the two Cyprus communities 
and their rights to be heard in international forums. The resolution was passed at the Istanbul Summit in May 
1976. The Istanbul Summit further agreed that the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus be invited to attend 
future meetings of the OIC as guests. However , the tenth Conference of foreign Ministers which took place in 
Morrocco in 1979 considered a change in the status of the Turkish Cypriot community from guests to that of 
observer status. The OIC called on all members to support the Turkish Cypriot community, particularly as a 
result of the economic embargo it suffered in the hands of the Greek Cypriots leadership. These relation between 
Turkey and OIC saw to the improvement of the Turkish economy especially in the 1980-1983 period. During 
this period the OIC gained importance in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey utilised its relations with the OIC to 
seek opportunities for Turkish firms from member countries to be able to solve the problems of unemployment at 
home. Turkey also hoped to gain access to Arab petrodollars, as alternatives to the credits they had been unable 
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to obtain from Western sources with a view to stimulating economic activities in Turkey as well as development 
projects. 
 
7. The EU and the Cyprus Dispute 
 
Generally, the EU is seen as an organization that has the potential of not only playing an important role in the 
Cyprus dispute, but is also seen as capable of bringing an end to the age long conflict on the island. It should be 
noted that Greece and Britain are EU members, while Turkey has been a candidate since 1987. This gives the EU 
all the importance and privilege it requires to intervene in the conflict and bring all contending parties to the 
negotiating table with a view to finding a lasting solution to the Cyprus dispute between the two Cypriot 
communities. It has been alleged by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots that the EU has tended to grant recognition 
to the Greek Cypriots as the official representatives of the Island. The Turkish Cypriots generally contend the 
right of the Greek Cypriots to be the official representatives of the island under internal law and obligations. The 
Turkish Cypriots see the attitude of the EU as one that is not encouraging the possibility of any settlement. The 
EU, in the opinion of the Turks, does not seem to give recognition to the Treaty of Establishment or the London 
or Zurich Accord as popularly known, which is believed to have supported the intervention of Turkey on the 
island. One issue that has made the position of the EU controversial is that of the membership of Cyprus into the 
EU. The EU had earlier issued a statement saying that membership could only be considered after a settlement is 
reached between the two Cypriot communities. However, the EU position was seen to have changed with 
regards to the membership of Cyprus and a new position was seen to emerge. According  to the new position, 
Cyprus (Greek) could be admitted into the EU irrespective of the lingering dispute between it and the Turkish 
Cypriots. This was a decision that was not seen to have gone down well with both the republic of Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots, who had for a long time harboured suspicions about the intentions of the EU towards the 
conflict in Cyprus. They generally claim that the membership of the Greek Cypriots into the EU will be a set 
back to the settlement process, and at the same time may potentially be an obstacle for Turkey’s membership bid 
in the EU. This is due to the fact the EU has constantly blamed Turkey for the division in Cyprus, and the 
Copenhagen Summit has made it expilicit that unless the Cyprus dispute and the Kurdish issues are resolved 
Turkey will remain outside the EU. 
 
8. Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute 
Since the 1963 dispute between the two communities in Cyprus, several efforts have been made to reconcile 
them, until the intervention of Turkey in 1974, which appeared to have brought about a division on the island. It 
was viewed to have complicated issues regarding settlement of the conflict. There have been many initiatives in 
the past by the United Nations on enosis or double enosis. While the Greek Cypriots appeared to have favored 
enosis with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey favored double enosis.  As a result of the disagreements 
over the enosis, it was abandoned as a solution to the problem. Many initiatives followed the Turkish 
intervention in 1974, and the United States was seen to have been deeply involved due to global concerns on the 
Cyprus dispute. The U.S. appointed an envoy to Cyprus that reported directly to the president. The U.S. was 
concerned with the disagreements between Greece and Turkey, which are all NATO members, and did not want 
a situation where two NATO allies would go to war. In the 1980’s , U.S. initiated what came to be known as the 
Ledsky Initiative, which sought to reconcile the two Cyprus communities towards unification, but did not 
succeed. After this, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal initiated some set of ideas, which were rejected by the Greek 
Cypriots on the grounds that the UN was not involved in the negotiations. But of all the settlement efforts, the 
most recent was that led by the UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, known as the Anan Plan which also sought to 
unify the two communities on equal partnership basis, a proposal that was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. And it 
was shortly after the Anan Plan that the Greek Cypriots joined the EU. This Further made hopes for 
reconciliation difficult. 
 
Generally, a federation had been the basis of all negotiations, since 1977, the high level agreements of that time 
favored the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal with regards to constitution, and by zonal in 
territorial aspect. However, there are so many fears regarding the success of the federal settlement in Cyprus, due 
mainly to lack of trust. Problems are also seen with regards to partition, in the event all settlement towards 
unification fail. But generally, most international organizations involved in the settlement of the Cyprus dispute 
tend to show recognition to the Greek Cypriots as a result of the presence of Turkish troops in the north, which 
they see as illegal in international law. While Turkey has continued to maintain that it had rights to maintain 
presence on the island. Until now, the options available are unification or official partition, which the two sides 
tend to suggest. There are Greek Cypriots that favor unification on bi-communal basis, and there are others also 
that favor an official partition. Some Turkish Cypriots also favor unification, whereas others do not. It has, 
however, been noted that the solution to the Cyprus problem is not dependent upon the wishes of the two Cyprus 
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communities, especially if the role of Turkey and the international community is taken into consideration. 
Speculations have emerged recently that in the event of a failure in any settlement effort, then formal partition 
will likely be considered as an option. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 From this paper one can understand the Cyprus dispute and the legal status of the intervention by Turkey in 1974. 
However, this position may be further scrutinized to see if another position can emerge. There is absolutely no 
doubt that the Guarantee Treaty has given right to Turkey to intervene in its affairs, but this was not done in 
accordance with universally accepted laid down proceedures of intervention. And as complicated as the Cyprus 
problem has become, there still appears a hope for a solution, but a solution that would require alot of sacrifice from 
both sides. Two solutions separately can be undertaken, one can be called majority solution, which considers the 
importance of maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus as a single country. For the success of the 
majority solution, the Republic of Turkey must withdraw from the island, and can then participate in re-negotiation 
of the partnership agreement and the drafting of a new constitution in consultation and consensus with the Greek 
Cypriots, under the supervision of the United Nations. No negotiation or peace agreements will appear to be forth 
coming provided Turkish troops remain on the island. The Greek Cypriots may be willing to welcome a peace plan, 
but without Turkey’s troops, and if security is so much a problem, a UN force could replace and provide this 
protection until when all is settled. For the minority solution, if both sides have reached a conclusion that the 
partnership republic is not feasible, then it is necesary for the two parties to come together in a friendly and 
harmonious manner, and partition the republic willingly, with the participation of the UN and other relevant bodies, 
so that the age old conflict will finally come to an end, and nations such as Turkey, that have been burdened by the 
problem which has caused the country so much, will have opportunity to pursue other interests that have been 
halted by the Cyprus issue. 
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